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We discuss how minimal financial market models can be constructed by bridging the gap between
two existing, but incomplete, market models: a model in which a population of virtual traders make
decisions based on common global information but lack local information from their social network,
and a model in which the traders form a dynamically evolving social network but lack any decision-
making based on global information. We show that a suitable combination of these two models
– in particular, a population of virtual traders with access to both global and local information –
produces results for the price return distribution which are closer to the reported stylized facts. We
believe that this type of model can be applied across a wide range of systems in which collective
human activity is observed.
INTRODUCTION
As a result of the increased availability of higher pre-
cision spatiotemporal datasets, coupled with the real-
ization that most real-world human systems are com-
plex, a new field of computational modeling has emerged
in which the goal is to develop minimal models of col-
lective human behavior which are consistent with the
observed real-world dynamics in a wide range of sys-
tems. For example, in the field of finance, the fluctu-
ations across a wide range of markets are known to ex-
hibit certain generic statistical stylized facts [1, 2, 3, 4].
Socio-economic systems were traditionally treated from
the points of view of game theory or traditional economic
theory. These approaches – while undoubtedly successful
in terms of gaining insight into core features – are unable
to address the issue of how and why such systems produce
the fluctuating external signals that they do [1, 2, 3, 4].
Human systems as diverse as traffic, Internet down-
loads, and financial markets, are all known to produce
large-scale fluctuations – for example, in the number of
cars taking a certain road, or the number of people ac-
cessing a certain website, or the number of people try-
ing to sell a stock at certain times[1, 2, 3, 4]. In previ-
ous decades, there was typically an insufficient amount
of reliable data available for researchers to address such
problems of dynamics. Nowadays, with the increase in
online logging of data – from social, governmental and
commercial sectors – this area of modeling now becomes
very attractive. However few advances are likely to be
made analytically, since any meaningful explanation of
the dynamics must be related back to what the collec-
tion of individual objects are doing. In other words, it
is what physicists call a many-body problem – one in
which the objects are subjected to endogenous and ex-
ogenous feedback and nonlinear interactions – and it is
known that such many-body problems are in general in-
tractable. Given the additional feature that the objects
themselves may be semi-autonomous (i.e. they each have
some form of independent decision-making ability such
that a given external input may yield various possible
outputs depending on some internal state of the object
itself) the most realistic route toward advancing our un-
derstanding of such systems is centered around compu-
tational modeling and simulation.
The attraction of studying financial markets is that
high frequency data can be obtained, albeit at a cost,
and the underlying actions of any individual trader are
ultimately quite simple: buy, sell or do nothing at any
timestep. A wide range of interesting stylized facts have
emerged based on analysis of the real market data over
a wide range of timescales – from seconds through to
days, weeks and months. In particular, it has been found
that the distribution of price returns (i.e. changes in
price between a given time t and a time t + ∆t later)
do not follow the simple distribution expected from a
random walk. The standard model of a financial market
– based on the efficient market hypothesis – is that price-
changes are like the toss of a coin. They are supposedly
independent – hence if we assume that each trader trades
according to the toss of a coin, then the probability of
buying and selling would a priori be 12 if we ignore the ‘do
nothing’ option. Counting a head as +1 in terms of price
change, and a tail as −1, the probability distribution for
having a given price-change ∆P = Nbuy−Nsell is simply
the probability of obtaining Nbuy heads and Nsell tails
from N coin-tosses, such that N = Nbuy +Nsell. This is
a binomial expression, which then approaches a Gaussian
in the large-N limit.
As a rough first approximation, financial market be-
havior is not far from the Gaussian model. However,
many independent detailed empirical studies of financial
2market returns have confirmed that major deviations be-
gin to arise in the tails of the distribution[1, 2, 3, 4].
Specifically, the distribution of price-changes ∆P de-
viates from Gaussian behavior at moderate values of
∆P . In particular, the probability of intermediate-to-
large price-changes is larger than the random coin-toss
model would suggest. This leads to the ‘fat tail’ descrip-
tion often aimed at financial markets – such fat-tailed
behavior is also common across a wide range of socio-
economic domains [1]. The fact that large price-changes
are more likely than expected – and in more general socio-
economic settings, that large traffic jams or heavy Inter-
net downloads are more likely than expected – suggests
that the population is unintentionally behaving in a coor-
dinated way. It is as though the supposedly independent
coin-tosses of the N traders are not in fact independent:
when one comes up heads, they are all more likely to come
up heads, and vice versa with tails. The fact that getting
the best price in a financial market is a competitive activ-
ity – in the same way that managing to grab space on a
busy road, or a download on a busy website, are also com-
petitive – means that such coordination is very unlikely
to have arisen through some intentional population-level
decision making. There is no central controller – and
even if there were, the fact that individual objects are
competing to win means that no central controller would
necessarily be listened to or followed. This coordination
observed in many scenarios where populations of humans
are competing for some limited resource, thereby lead-
ing to larger than random probability for large events, is
characteristic of many human systems. But if so, what
causes it and how can we provide a quantitative model of
it? Because of the generic nature of this fat tail statistics,
any model cannot depend on the details of the particular
market or type of trader, or road or type of car, or web-
site or type of computer. Instead it must be some fairly
general feature of collective human activity.
The fundamental question as to what underlying model
might best represent such collective coordination, has in-
spired a new breed of computer-based scientific inves-
tigation involving physical, biological and social scien-
tists. At its root, a system such as a financial mar-
ket, traffic system, or the Internet, involves agents (i.e.
people) deciding between a few options (e.g. buy, sell,
do nothing) based on some limited information – which
may be global or locally generated – and then compet-
ing with the remaining agents for the available resource
or reward. Collective coordination requires some form
of trader inter-connectedness. One way in which this
could have arisen, is if subsets of the traders form so-
cial groups such that they and their immediate friends
or associates, coordinate their actions (i.e. bias their de-
cisions and hence effectively connect their coins during
the coin-toss). In fast-moving financial markets, such
groups are likely to change fairly rapidly, and should at
least be accounted for using dynamical models of such
group formation. This idea has led to a particular class
of models based on dynamical cluster formation. No-
table examples include the dynamical clustering model
of Egu´ıluz and Zimmermann[6] and of others in biology
[5][7]. A second way in which coordination could have
arisen, concerns how agents react to a particular piece of
common information. Models of this form, of which a no-
table example is the so-called Grand Canonical Minority
Game [8], feature agents whose actions are dictated by a
strategy (or set of strategies). In the first case of real clus-
ters, the grouping is intentional, while in the second case
agents form unintentional groups (i.e. crowds) as a result
of using the same strategy at the same time and hence
acting identically over a short period of time. These two
classes of model are complementary. Each of these mod-
els is ‘minimal’ in the sense that they are the simplest
known examples which seem to capture the essential in-
gredients of clustering and decision-making respectively.
To date, the two classes of model have been studied sep-
arately – however, they should clearly both be combined
in order to understand the interplay of local and global
information on collective group formation and hence the
collective dynamics.
In this paper, we analyze a collective human system in
which there are simultaneously local interactions as ob-
served in the Egu´ıluz and Zimmermann[6] model (i.e. E-
Z model) and global interactions as observed in the Grand
Canonical Minority Game [8] (i.e. GCMG). The focus of
this paper is on how adding global interactions to the E-Z
model, does indeed improve the fit with the known em-
pirical distributions of financial market returns. Our con-
struction is a modified E-Z model in which the agents are
randomly assigned the trading strategies and apply their
strategy based on the last two price movements. Since
there is no strategy score introduced yet, the system so
far does not have effectively a memory and behaves as
relative majority vote system.
RELATIVE MAJORITY VOTE
The relative majority vote system is specified by two
parameters, the total number of agents N and the con-
sensus parameter x. At each time-step (to set up a time
scale we need to prescribe some time-scale constant) an
agent is chosen at random and the group to which the
agent belongs to is pointed. The size of this group is
denoted as s. Once a particular group has been pointed
to it makes a decision in the following way: Each agent
votes either to sell, buy or wait (see Fig. 1) with approx-
imate probability 1/3 for each of the listed options. If the
number of votes for the most popular decision exceeds
the threshold, which is defined as
T ≡ x · s (1)
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FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of the decision process.
the consensus is reached and the decision is performed,
otherwise there is no consensus and the group breaks into
single individuals. The group that decides to wait does
not trade but joins another group by choosing randomly
any other agent from the entire population and merging
with a group to which this agent belongs. Let us for a
particular group of size s denote by S,B,W the number
of agents who vote to sell, buy or wait (and merge with
another group) respectively. The conditions for the group
decision are precisely
Fragments: (W < T ) ∧ (S < T ) ∧ (B < T )
Buys: (B ≥ T ) ∧ (B > S) ∧ (B >W)
Sells: (S ≥ T ) ∧ (S > B) ∧ (S >W)
Merges: (W ≥ T ) ∧ (W > B) ∧ (W > S)
(2)
We need also to account for the fact we may have tied
number of votes, which is resolved by randomly picking
one of the ”tied” decisions, e.g. if
(S ≥ T ) ∧ (S = B) ∧ (S >W)
then the group either sells or buys. The decision pre-
sented in (2) are exclusive, therefore for the correspond-
ing conditional probabilities (on the condition that the
particular group is chosen) it holds that
pˆ frg + pˆ sell + pˆ buy + pˆmerge = 1 , (3)
where pˆ frg is the probability that the group fragments.
Note that the above conditional probabilities depend on
the group size s. From the symmetry of (2) and (3) we
see that is sufficient to know pˆ frg since
pˆ sell = pˆ buy = pˆmerge =
1− pˆ frg
3
. (4)
We calculate the combinatorial expression as
pˆ frg(s) =
s!
3s
s−1∑
W=0
min(T −1,s−W)∑
B=s−T −W
1
W !B!(s− B −W)!
(5)
The system may be described by the mean field theory,
disregarding the fluctuations and finite size effects. We
denote by ns the average number of groups of size s.
For the steady state the set of master equations is semi-
4analytic theory
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FIG. 2: Cumulative return distribution in arbitrary units for consensus parameter x = 37% (solid line), x = 41% (dashed line)
and x = 47% (dashed-dotted line). The number of agents used was 10000. The power-law exponents refer to the underlying
return distribution, and hence differ from the cumulative distribution value by unity
recursive[9] and is written as
−
s
N
pˆ frg(s)(1 − δs1)ns
−
[
1
N
pˆmerge(s) +
1
N2
N∑
s′=1
s′pˆmerge(s
′)
]
s ns
+
s−1∑
s′=1
s′ ns′ (s− s
′)ns′ pˆmerges
′
+δs,1
N∑
s′=s+1
pˆ frg(s
′)s′2ns′ = 0 . (6)
The above set may be solved numerically [10]. To be able
to model not just the mean behaviour but also the correc-
tions coming from the fluctuations, we need to perform
direct simulations of the system described by (6).
We are interested in the situation when the consensus
parameter is within the range of x = (33 1/3 %, 50%).
If x < 33 1/3 % there is no fragmentation, if x > 50%
we have the absolute majority vote condition. When
x → 33 1/3 % from above we expect that the return
distribution approaches the one for the original Egu´ıluz-
Zimmermann system, which shows a power law with ex-
ponent 1.5 over large scale of return sizes. As we in-
crease x slightly over 33 1/3 % the dominant behavior of
the buy/sell probability pˆ buy = pˆ sell for the large groups
(of order s v 100) is an exponential cut-off, while for
smaller s we have the finite size effect. This modifies the
model in two ways: The group distribution changes since
the conditional probabilities enter Eq. (6), and the trade
mechanism changes. Unlike the E-Z system [6] (where
mostly the large groups trade) we expect to have the
trades coming from the actions of the small groups with
the exponential cut-off due to the behavior of Eq. (5).
SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulations were performed for a system with
N = 105 agents, m = 2, and 106 time steps, with three
different values of the consensus parameter. The initial
state of information was (1, 1). After 105 time steps (in
order to allow the system to reach equilibrium) the re-
turns where computed as follows: If a cluster of size s
decided to buy, the return was +s. If a cluster of size
s decided to sell, the return was −s. After the simu-
lation was complete, the time was rescaled by adding
the returns of two consecutive time steps since on av-
erage a transaction occurred once every two time steps.
Thus, the results in Fig. 2 are for 9 ∗ 105/2 time steps
5effectively. It is observed that indeed most of the trades
come from the action of the small groups. While the
consensus parameter is increased the distribution of the
returns is falling more sharply due to the dominance of
the exponential cut-off. The results are shown in Fig. 2.
These results demonstrate that the addition of access to
global information and subsequent decision-making into
a model built primarily around local group formation,
leads to a hybrid model which can better capture fea-
tures of the known empirical distributions. In short, both
local group formation and global information are impor-
tant when building a minimal computational model of
financial markets – and, by extension, collective human
activity in any domain in which competition exists be-
tween a collection of interconnected agents.
DISCUSSION
We have explored a simple system featuring the com-
bination of locally and globally interacting agent-based
models, as part of a more general quest for minimal com-
putational models of real socio-economic systems based
on individual-based behavior. Such minimal models aim
to incorporate the minimum number of features (and
hence parameters) that make the individuals’ behavior
and interactions appear credible, and yet are consistent
with the maximum number of empirical stylized facts
based on real-world data. In particular, we have proposed
a simple construction which features global interactions
(via the heterogeneity of strategies held by the agents)
as well as agent memory in the locally interacting system
(the grouping model).
Our specific results are as follows. The scenario in
which the agents are allowed to vote introduces the ex-
ponential cut-off starting at the scale where the effects
connected to the discrete nature of the system may be
neglected. Our results show that those who usually trade
are the small groups, and that there are no trades coming
from the large groups. By contrast in the original E-Z
model, the conditional probabilities are constant and any
particular large group trades more often than a particular
small group. Since the group distribution shows a power
law behavior over a large scale of group size, the action of
the large groups occurs more often than is indicated by
empirical data. The most realistic minimal model (which
is as yet undiscovered) should lie somewhere in between.
Any voting scenario is a Poisson process which introduces
the exponential cut-off to the system appearing at a scale
where the number of individuals involved is large enough
that we may disregard the discrete nature of the system.
The modeling challenge is therefore to make the decision-
making process reflect more complicated behavior of the
individuals such as possession of memory, behavior based
on past experience, and passing the information between
groups about whether to trade or not.
In terms of more general issues of computational mod-
eling, we have tried to highlight the need to develop mini-
mal computational models of real socio-economic systems
through individual-based behavior. Future theoretical
developments in such fields lie beyond simply integrat-
ing some form of phenomenological equation. Moreover,
this sort of socio-economic modeling is an application of
computation that is set to boom in the future given the
growing availability of high-frequency data from socio-
economic systems – and the fundamental philosophical
need for theories which treat dynamical fluctuations in
addition to mean behavior. One particular example in
which this philosophy is now being developed, is in im-
proving our understanding of human conflict – by looking
at the stylized facts of conflict dynamics in exactly the
same way as has been done for financial markets. Indeed,
we have recently shown that remarkably similar minimal
computational models can be built, with equally satisfy-
ing agreement with empirical data, simply by combining
together global and local interactions among agents. This
work on human conflict will be discussed in more detail
elsewhere.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
NFJ is very grateful to Pak Ming Hui (Chinese Uni-
versity of Hong Kong) for discussions.
[1] See for example, the wide range of publications and con-
ferences around this common theme of computational
modeling of socio-economic systems, which is available
at website www.unifr.ch/econophysics
[2] J.-P. Bouchaud, M. Potters: Theory of Financial Risk
and Derivative Pricing: From Statistical Physics to Risk
Management. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
Second Edition (2004)
[3] R. N. Mantegna, H. E. Stanley: An Introduction to
Econophysics: Correlations and Complexity in Finance.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1999)
[4] N. F. Johnson, P. Jefferies, P.M. Hui: Financial Market
Complexity. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2003)
[5] S. Gueron and S.A. Levin: The Dynamics of Group For-
mation. Mathematical Biosciences 128, 243–246 (1995)
[6] V.M. Egu´ıluz and M.G. Zimmermann: Transmission of
Information and Herd Behaviour: An Application to Fi-
nancial Markets. Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5659–5662 (2000)
[7] R. Cont, J.-P. Bouchaud: Herd Behavior and Aggregate
Fluctuations in Financial Markets, Macroeconomic Dy-
namics 4, 170196 (2000)
[8] D. Challet and Y.C. Zhang: Emergence of Cooperation
and Organization in an Evolutionary Game. Phys. A 246,
407–418 (1997)
[9] The equation for nl depends on ni for i = 1 . . . l − 1 and
on a constant being a function of all ni’s
6[10] The numerical procedure of solving 6 is effective for lim-
ited values of N as at least 1/2N2 iteration steps are
required
